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Observing the limitations of small domestic  be amended to accommodate the welfare effects
markets, Bela Balassa has advocated low,  of changes in scale efficienicy.
uniform, across-the-board tariffs and export
subsidies - that is, tariffs of X percent balanced  Calculations comparing trade policies that
by cxport subsidies of X percent - to overcome  achieve neutrality of incentives betwecn sales to
the disadvantages of small domestic markets and  domcstic and forcign markets suggest that -
to permit the exploitation of cconomics of scale  under the most plausible scenarios about the
through specialization according to comparative  cntry and exit of firns  - cxport promotion is
advantage.  likely to bc more beneficial than protection for
sectors with increasing retums to scale.
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and empirically that economics of scale compli-  Illustrative calculations of optimal trade
catc analysis of the welfare effccts of trade  policy packages suggest that the benefits of
policy, especially when some sectors have  departing from the principle of nondiscrimina-
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insufficient to justify their higher administrative
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...in developing  countries  where  protective  barriers  are  high  and there  is bias  against  the
exportsofmanufactured  goods,  the  limitations  of domesticmarketsgenerallypermnitonly
the consruction  of plants that are below  optimum size. By contrast,  the  disadvantages
of small  national  markets  are  surmounted  in countries  where  low  protective  barimers  and
the lack of bias  against  exports  perm  it efficient-scale  operations  through  specialization
according  to comparative  advantage...
Balassa (1971,  78-79)
New  developments  in the theory  of international trade often suggest,  implicitly  or explicitly,  that in
an imperfectly  competitive  environment,  government intervention  may  be needed to achieve  optimality.
The most celebrated  example  in this  new literature is  the profit-shifting  argument  of Brander  and Spencer
(1984).  Anotherexample,  perhapsmorewidelyapplicable,  is  the argument  developedbyKrugman  (1985)
showing  that protection can serve as an export promotion policy  under certain circumstances. These
arguments have  fostered a literature on strategic  trade theory,  which  deals  with conditions  of imperfect
competition  between  international  trading  partners.  1  The trade and development  literature,  on the  other
hand, concentrates  on the implications  of imperfectly  competitive  domestic  markets.
In the first of Balassa's  (1971) comparative studies on trade policies in developing  countries, he
argued (in the passage  quoted above) that the small size  of domestic markets in developing countries
was a hindrance to the exploitation  of scale economies. He recommended  policies  to promote exports
as a way to break this bottleneck. In his second comparative  study of trade policies in semi-industrial
countries (Balassa 1982),  he ascribed the superior performance  of the outward-oriented  development
strategies in East Asia to the provision  of equal incentives  to sales  on the home and export markets (that
is,  to the avoidance  of home-market  bias). Further, in recognition  of the learning  effects  and externalities
that accompany  the establishment  of new  industries,  Balassa  (1975)  recommended  tempo!  ary  protection
to new activities,  which  would  be gradually  scaled  down  to an across-the-board  protection level  of about
10  percent. In favorirg  market neutrality,  Balassa  is not only  applying  the principle  of nondiscrimination,
but he is  also emphasizing  trade policy  rules,  or rules of thumb,  that have low  administrative  costs and do
not depend on econometric  evidence  for their administration.
In this paper, we explore the robustness of these strategies in a setting that is representative of
semi-industrial  market structures  and conduct. We recognize  that production  in some industrial  sectors
takes place under increasing  returns to scale and that pricing  in tradable sectors distinguishes  between
domestic  and export  markets. The home country  is  assumed  to be a price-taker  in both import and export
markets. Thus terms  of trade are fixed,  and we rule out the possibility  of strategic  trade policy  to exploit
monopoly  power in international trade (the possibility  of using trade policy  to shift profits to domestic
firms).  (By contrast, the strategic trade literature assumes that oligopolistic interactions occur in-2-
international  markets, so thai trade policy  affects  the home  country's  terms  of trade -circumstances that
are more representative of at .eloped countries than semi-industrial  ones.) Thne  purpose of the paper is
then to reexamine the merits of protection, with and without neutrality  of domestic and foreign  sales
incentives,when  some manufacturingsectorsoperate  underincreasingreturns  toscale anddomesticfirms
behave oligopolistically.
We first  derive analycically  the comparativestatics  of tariff  and subsidypolicyin  the setting  described
above,  and then we derive criteria for optimal  tariff-subsidy  policies. Because  of intermediate linkages,
the welfare effects of trade policy  changes are not generally  determinate in this multisectoral,  general
equilibrium setting. This provides the motivation for our simulation  analysis,  which is prefaced by a
summary  of the model and a discussion  of alternative specifications  of oligopoly  behavior. Next, we
explore systematically  the effects  of tariffs and export subsidies  on welfare  with a computable general
equilibrium (CGE) model of a representative semi-industrial  country with increasing returns and
oligopoly  behavior in selected manufacturing  activities. Finally,  we return to the issues  of neutrality  and
optimal protection, comparing  the welfare effects of trade policies  that provide  only import protection
for sectors with scale economies  with those of policies  that combine tariffs  and export subsidies.
Welfare Determinants  of Trade  Policy Under Increasing  Returns
This section presents basic analytical results on the welfare effects of import tariffs and export
subsidies. It extends the work of Dixit (1984)  and Rodrik (1988)  by encompassing  export subsidies,  the
selling  of sectoral  output on different  markets (domestic  and export),  and imperfect  substitution  between
domestic and imported goods. These features are reproduced in the model  structure of the empirical
application in later sections. In this setting, we show that both import tariffs and export subsidies
contribute to distortions in domestic demand.  On the supply side, our results indicate that tariff
protection alone may  induce  producers  to divert output from exports  to the domestic  market rather than
expanding  production  and realizingscale  economics. When  protection  and export  incentives  are neutral,
however,  we show that scale  economies  can be realized  that will  offset  or even  outweigh  the welfare  costs
of distortions in demand. We conclude the section with the derivation  of a general expression for the
optimal tariff-subsidy  combination. The expression takes explicit account of the linkages and cost
externalities that arise under increasing  returns in a general equilibrium  context. The expression  also
shows how optimal trade policy necessitates a mixture of domestic market protection and export
incentives  to balance the relative  profitability  of sales in the two markets.
Notational conventions follow Dixit (1984). The economy has k sectors, each consisting  of ni
identical  firms  (i -= I ,...,k)  producing  output (z 1) for domestic  use (yi)  and  export (xi). As in the numerical
application  below.  fii  m  output and sales  allocation  decisions  are separable. Hence  the allocation  decision
along  a continuous transformation  surface.  z, = Fi(xiy,),  depends only  on relative  prices  in the producer's
domestic and export markets for  output.2 Each identical  firm  has a representative cost function  ci(x0yj).
Domestic  and world prices  are  k-vectorsp  and P, respectively,  as are ad valorem  import  tariffs  t and export
subsidies  s. Sectoral domestic  prices are an inverse  functionp(q) of domestic  demands.  qi = M; + niYi,
themselves  an aggregate  of imports  and domestic output for domestic  use.
Toevaluate the welfare  effect of  import  and export  distortions,  we  consider  all  sectors simultaneously
in a general equilibrium framework. In a situation in which the government makes only lump-sum-3 -
transfersandcommodity  preferences  are thoseofasinglerepresentativeconsumer,  aggregatewelfarecan
be decomposed  into three components. The first of these is  consumer  surplus,
q
(1)  g(q) = fp(t!)du  -p(q)q,
0
or the area under sectoral demand curves, net of domestic sales revenues. The second component of
domestic welfare  is the sum of firm  profits across  sectors:
(2)  n 'r  = n'[py + P(I+s)x -c(x,y),
where a caret expands the vector in question  into a diagonal matrix  and a prime denotes a trans. osition.
This expression accounts for revenues from domestic and export sales (which  may be subsidized)  and
total cost.  The third component of domestic welfare is tariff revenue net of export subsicay  outlays,
[t'PM-  s 'fPx]. It reflects the direct change  in domestic  income due to the imposition  of trade-  distorting
measures  when world prices  are fixed.
The resulting  domestic  welfare function  is then given  by
(3)  W =  g(q) + n  +-  t'PM -s Prr
=g(q)+:-  i+*&-c(xy)j+t'PM.
We are interested primarily  in the welfare effects of trade policies in the form of tariffs and export
subsidies. Total differentiation of expression  3 gives a decomposition  of the welfare effects of trade
policy  changes:
(4)  dW = t'qp(pdt +  pds)  + n '(1- c,) [(yp  + xp)pdt
+ (x5  +  y3)ds1  -n'(a -c,) zn-dn.
Subscripts  denote partial differentiation. So  qp  is the Jacobian matrix  of price derivatives  for domestic
demand, and y  and x5 are matrices  of direct supply responses in domestic and export markets. The
Jacobian cz is the marginal cost matrix for domestic production, including (off the diagonal) cost
externalities that may be conferred by increasing returns sectors.  The vector a = zc(x,y)  contains
sectoral average costs.
The first term on the right  side of expression  4 measures  the distortionary  cost in consumption  and
is negative when the domestic demand curve slopes downward. We have assumed that imports and
domestic goods are imperfect substitutes in use and that domestic goods are imperfect substitutes in
domestic and export sales. These assumptions  of product differentiation imply  that domestic prices  are
endogenous and can be affected by  either tariffs  or export subsidies. So, under the assumption  that the
aggregate demand curve is downward  sloping,  the first term on the right side of expression  4 indicates
welfare losses  from consumption  distortions  due to a tariff (dt), an export  subsidy  (ds).  or a combination
of the two. This term corresponds to the standard welfare costs of protection in the case of constant
returns to scale.Scale efficiency  effects, which are summarized  in the second term on the right side of equation 4,
are slightly  more complex. Note first tha,  .vith  normal demand behavior,  benefits from protection  can
arise from expansion  of total output in sectors with scale economies. Domestic  supply  can be expected
to rise with domestic prices  (yp>O)  and exports  with the subsidy  rate (x 3>O). However,  the net effect of
each of these direct supply responses on total sectoral output depends on the extent of intermarket
diversion. Rising domestic prices may induce a diversion from exports to an increasingly  lucrative
domestic market (xp<O),  while subsidies  might  induce diversion  in the opposite direction (y,>O). The
ultimate effect on output depends on the relative  magnitudes  of the supply  and diversion  e,fects (zp
yp+ x andz, =XS  + Y) and is ultimately  an empirical  question. What  is clear from expression  4, however,
is that tariffs and export subsidies  can be beneficial  if domestic firms' marginal  costs are below  world
prices. Thus,  with no firm  entry or exit, tariffs  and subsidies  can be beneficial if the efficiency  gains from
scale  expansion  exceed the distortionary  costs  of protection.
The third term in expression  4 represents the effects  on welfare of changes  in the number  of firms.
The negative  sign indicates that, where there are scale economies, firm  entry is detrimental to welfare
and that the magnitude  of the welfare loss  increases  with the degree of unexploiUed  scale economies.
We now  pose the questio.,: What  would  be an optimal  choice  of tariff  and subsidy  levels  with  respect
to our domestic welfare function?  Given the qualitative symmetry  of tariff and subsidy  effects, it is
unlikely  that any policy  that implements  one without  the other could be optimal,  but their interplay  may
be more subtle than simple rules of thumb  such ac neutrality  (equal rates) would  imply.
We now  derive optimal tariff and subsidy  rates in the context of the model already presented. To
simplify  discussion,  we assume that there is no firm  entry or exit.
To maximize  domestic  welfare,  we form the Lagrangian  expression
(5)  L(t,s)  = IV(t,s) +A[z-F(x,y)1.
which  leads to first-order  conditions  of the form
(6)  W, = I 'qp + n '(l -c,) (yp + xp) = A(ZP-  Frxp  -F,yp)
and
(7)  Ws =t  qs  + n '(1 -c)  (x  +ys) = A (Zs -Frs  -F,y,).
The last two equations can be solved for the vector of optimal tariffs:
(8)  t  n  (I-,)yP 
This expression  shows  that the optimal tariff  depends on the extent of unexploited  scale economies  and
on the elasticities  of supplv and demand. Conditions  for a nonzero optimal tariff are initial marginal
costs below world prices or falling from that lcvel. nonzero elasticity of domestic supply, and finite
elasticity  of domestic  demand. Expression  8 also takes account of interactions  across the economy  and
thus derives  consistent optimal policy  instruments  for all  sectors simultaneously.-5-
An optimal tariff-subsidy  combination  wilt tic  one that equates the marginal  rate of transformation
between domestic and export markets with their respective  relative prices,  that is, one where MRT =
Fx  I  Fy =  p / (1  +s) in the one-sector case. More generally,  the optimal  tariff-subsidy  combinationwill  be
given  by
(9)  (I  + s)F,  =p~Fy .
Assuming  that the Jacobians  Fx  and Fy  are diagonal.  then the optimal  export subsidy  would  be that which
exactly  equalizes the value of marginal  domestic product between the two markets. In the numerical
exercises  below, we com?ute the vector of optimal export subsidies  for a selected vector of uniform
import tariffs.
Modeling  Oligopolistic  Domestic Markets
Since  the analytical  results  presented above  are ambiguous  with respect to the effects  of trade policy
onwelfare,we use  numerical  analysisto  reveal  the relative  importance  of factors  affectingoverallwelfare.
First, we describe briefly the structure of the CGE model used for the simulation exercises in the
remainder of the paper.
As was  the case in the analytics  of the previous  section, the model  specifies  product ditterentiation
between exports and domestic sales and between imports  and domestically  produced goods  in domestic
demand. Again, the country is small in international markets. A Leontief technology is specified  for
intermediate technology.  Within sectors, however, domestic and  imported inputs are imperfect
substitutes.  This assumption of product differentiation ,s also maintained for sectors with scale
economies. In those se:tors, goods are produced by ni identical firms. Thus all goods produced for
domestic sale in the same  sector are perfect substitutes,  allowing  us to aggi  4e sectoral supply  across
firms. Consumption  demand across  sectors is  dcscribed  by a linear expenditure system  with nonunitary
income elasticities  of demand. Finally,  value-added  is produced  by a constant elasticity  of substitution
technology  for two primary  factors  of production,  capital and labor (mobile across  sectors), and there is
a Leontief technology  between aggregate  value-added  and aggregate  intermediates. All final  demands
arise  trom a representative consumer,  who  also receives  net tax  revenues  as a lump-sum  income  transfer.
As in Harris (1984),  fixed  costs include  capital and labor  (equal weight  on each).
We contrast the case of constant returns to scale (where marginal  cost pricing  prevails)  with two
pricing hypotheses  in sectors with increasing  returns to scale.
In the first alternative,  we specify  an analogue to the case of perfect competition under constant
returns to scale. We assume costless  entry / exit,  so that the threat of entry forces incumbent firms  to
price at average cost. In this contestable-market  scenario (omitting  sectoral subscripts),
(10)  p.=  a.
for each sector with incrcasing  returns to scale,  wherep, is the unit price from the constant elasticity  of
transformation  cost function associated  with the transformation  function describing  sales allocation  to-6-
the domestic and export markets. Here pz is the weighted  sum of unit sales prices on the domestic (p)
and export (1 +s) markets and a is average costs.
In the second alternative,  we assume  that each (identical)  firm  behaves  in the domestic  market as a
monopolist facing a downward-sloping  demand curve.  In equilibrium,  each firms equates marginal
revenue with marginal  costs (ci), that is,
- C p  ne
where E is the endogenous elasticity  of demand on domestic  sales given  by
(12)  e = eS'  + EVS,
where F(v) denotes final  (intermediate)  demand and  eF and ev  are functions  of the parameters  describing
substitution effects in intermediate and final demand.  Because equation 12 is part of the system of
equations that must be satisfied  in equilibrium,  e is endogenous. The variable Q is the representative
firm's  conjecture about the response  of competitors  to its output decision  with respect to firmj. That is,
ifz1 denotes the aggregate  output of the rema,ning firms  in its sectors,  then Q = Azj / Azj. The value  of Q
is  obtained as follows.  By  choize of units, n is set equal to unity in expression 11. Since  the value of  f  is
determined by the parameters  and quantities  in the model,  if one takesp and  c, as data, then the value  of
Q is  determined by  solving  equation 11. We  denote by Q the value  of the calibrated  representative firm's
conjecture.
We contrast two rules for determining  firm entry  / exit. Define
(13)  r-;ry  +7,
where  X is profit per unit  of sales  and subscriptsy  andx denote sales to the domestic  and export markets,
respectively. In the first alternative,  firm  entry is determined to ensure that profit per unit of total sales
is zero. This assumes  that export subsidies  allow  firms  to make  a profit on export sales. However,  since
export  subsidies  are often  justified  as a way  of defraying  the cost of opening  new markets,  it is reasonable
to consider  the alternative  case in which  subsidies  to export sales  do not give  rise to above  normal  profits.
In that second alternative,  firm  entry is determined to give  zero profit on domestic  sales.
One would  expect that the degree of firm  collusion  would  vary  with the number  of firms. The fewer
the number of firms, the more collusive is behavior likely to be.  To capture this -ffect, we add the
following  equation to determine conjectures:
(14)  Q = n-l,
which  completes the description  of the model.-7-
A Comparison of Trade Policies Under Constant
and Increasing Returns to Scale
We  now  turn  to  illustrative  numerical  calculations  based  on  the  model outlined  above.  All
simulations refer to the effects of a departure  from free trade in an archetypal semi-industrial economy.5
The structure  of the economy in the hypothetical free trade solu.ion is described in table 1. Of the
seven sectors, one is nontradable.  The data on sectoral structure  indicate an open economy with high
trade  shares  in GDP.  Sectoral  value-added  ratios are quite  low, indicating  the strong  interindustry
linkages observed in asemi-industrial economy. The three sectorswith increasing returns to scale account
for 42 percent  of gross output,  73 perccnt of export sales, and 51 percent  of import expenses.  For the
simulations in this section, we assume a low and uniform cost-disadvantage  ratio of 10 percent in sectors
with economies  of scale.'4
Table  2 gives the  results  of simulations  comparing  the  cffects  of tariff  protection  and  export
subsidization.  All simulations reler to 10-percent tariff ratcs and 10-percent export subsidy rates.  We
contrast  four scenarios: constant  returns to scale (CRTS) across all sectors, contestable-market  pricing
for the  three  sectors  with increasing returns  to scale, and  Cournot  competition  with total  profit or
domestic profit determining  firm cntry.  The results presented  in table 2 are for protection  or export
subsidization of (1) sectors with constant  returns  to scale only (primarv, food processing, and traded
services); (2) sectors with increasing returns to scale only (consumer goods, producer goods, and heavy
industry); or (3) all traded sectors.
Two measures  of the  welfare  effects of changes  in trade  policy are  reported  in table  2.  The
equivalent  variation  measure  is derived  from the indirect  utilitv function  associated with the  Stone-
Geary utility function assumed for final demand.  It is an aggregate measure of efficiency gains and losses
in production  and of efficiency losses in consumption.  Equivalent  variation measures how much the
representative  consumer would have to be compensated  at the new set of prices to be indifferent to the
bundle of goods now available at the initial set of prices. The second measure is the scale efficiency gain
or loss from moving along average cost curves.5 Like equivalent variation, scale efficiency evaluates the
new output  level at old prices, so that the measure controls for shifts in the average cost curve induced by
changes in factor and product prices.
Now let us examine the results presentcd in tabk. '.. Consider First  the results tinder constant returns
to scale in the first three columns.  In the case of tariff protection, there is a welfare loss from protection
regardless of which group of sectors is protected.  As expected, the welfare cost of protection  increases
with the numberofsectors  beingprotected.  Note that the correspondingwelfare  lossestimates forexport
subsidizationyieldvery similarorders of magnitude, with the differences dependingon  tradevolumes and
substitution elasticities.
Turn now to the case of contestable-market  pricing, which assumes increasing rcturns to scale for
the consumer goods. producer goods. and heavy industrysectors.  Now protection ofsectors with constant
returns to scale is muchi  more costlv because a scale efficiency loss rcsults when resources are pulled out
of sectors with scale economies.  The loss of scale efficiency occurs because firms are forced to produm_
higher up on their avcragc cost curvcs. Bv contrast. protection  of sectors w ith increasing returns to scale
is much less costly becausc of the scale ei'ficiencv gain.  Note, howevei. that ceen though protection  is
provided across the board for scctorsAwith  increasing returns to scale, there is a scale efficiencv loss in  oneTable  1.  Sectoral  Features  of  the  Semi-Industriat  Economy
Share  in  Imports/  Elasticity  of  Export  Import  Cost  dis-  Domestic  price
gross  Exports/  domestic  substitution  supply  elasticity  advantage  eLasticity
Sector  output  (X)  output  (X)  sales  (X)  in  production elasticitya  of  demanda  ratio  of demand
Primary  8.9  4.9  40.4  2.5  0.75  1.8  --  -- Food products  9.6  2.5  6.5  1.5  1.5  2.5  --  -- Consumer  goods  14.4  32.5  14.2  1.0  1.5  2.4  0.1  1.6 Producer  goods  20.1  16.6  19.2  0.9  1.5  2.2  0.1  1.3 Heavy industry  7.7  31.9  41.0  0.9  1.5  1.9  0.1  1.4 Traded  services  13.2  24.4  7.5  1.5  1.5  2.0  --
Nontraded  services  26.1  --  0.9  --  --  --
a. Expenditure-compensated  price eLesticities. For imports  (exports),  expenditures  (sales)  on constant  elasticity  of substitution  X (transformation)  a  egate  of  domestic  and  import  (export)  goods  held  constant.
b. The  cost  disadvantage  ratio  (difference  between  average  and  marginal  costs  divided  by  average  cost)  is  a  measure  of unrealized  economies
of scale.Table  2.  A Comparison  of  the  Vetfare  Effects  of  Tariffs  ard Export  Smidi.-s under  Different  Pricing  Conditions
Cournot  b  Courrot
CRTS  Contestable3  (total  profit)  (domestic  profit)c
Sector  CRTS  IRTS  All  CRTS  IRTS  Ail  CRTS  IRTS  Alt  CRTS  IRTS  All
Ten-percent  tariff
Equivalent  variation  -7  -9  -12  -50  -2  -46  12  60  78  -33  -30  -57 Scale  efficiency  (total)  -42  6  -34  19  69  88  -27  -22  -47 Producer  goods  -14  -8  -21  9  33  42  -7  -8  -14 Consumer goods  -24  15  -8  8  15  23  -3  -6  -8 Heavy industry  -4  -1  -5  2  21  23  -3  -6  -8
Firm  entry  (+)/exit  (-)
Producer  goods  -5  -9  -14  -1  2  1 Consubner  goods  -5  -1  -5  -1  4  4 Heavy industry  -2  -1  -12  0  4  4
Ten-percent  export  subsidy
Equivalent  variation  -6  -19  -13  -45  52  27  52  -168  -108  18  15  36 Scale  efficiency  (total)  -39  74  42  57  -155  -97  24  25  46 Producer  goods  -14  38  26  23  -69  -46  8  7  14 Consumer goods  -15  22  10  21  -48  -27  12  14  24 Heavy industry  -10  14  6  13  -38  -24  4  4  8
Firm  entry(+)/exit  (-)
Producer  goods  -8  23  15  -4  2  -1 Consumer goods  -6  11  6  -4  0  -4 Heavy industry  -9  22  13  -5  1  -4
CRTS  =  constant  returns  to  scale;  IRTS =  increasing  returns  to  scale;
Note:  All  figures  are  basis  points.  Figures  for  equivalent  variation  and scale  efficiency  are  basis  points  of  GOP  (e.g.,  -168  is  1.68% of GOP); figures  for  entry/exit  are  basis  points  of  initial  number of  firms.
a.  Pricing  according  to  equation  10.
b.  Pricing  according  to  equation  11,  with  firm  entry/exit  determined  by  total  profits,  so  that  i  = 0. c.  Same  as  note  b but  with  firm  entry  determined  by profits  on  domestic  sales,  so  that  sy  =  0.- 10-
sector.  Finally, protecting all  actors results in a larger welfare loss than under the scenario of constant
rc  urns to scale in all sectors because of scale efficiency losses.
o,ow, compare these results with those for export subsidization in thc bottom half of the table. The
subsidization results corroborate  Balassa's assertion that specialization according tocomparativeenables
the disadvantages of small national markets to be surmounted  in sectors with unexploited economies of
scale. As before, the benefits are greatest when trade policy is confined to sectors with increasing returns
to scale. The export subsidization effects dominate the tariff protection effects because of the difficulty
of substituting away from imports when incentives are provided to domestic producers, and the ease of
expanding sales in international  markets when market share is small.
When contestable  market pricing is replaced by Cournot  competition. the welfare effects of trade
policy are affected by three  additional  adjustment  mechanisms: firm cntry / exit (the  mechanism that
achieves  zero profits  in long-run equilibrium),  the endogeneity  of firm collusion, and-generally  less
significant-the  anti-competitive cffect of protection. which lowers the elasticity of domestic demand, e.6
The most important  of these mechanisms in influencing (hc welfare effects of trade  policy under
Cournot competition  is thc pattern  of firm entry or exit. Take the case of tariff protection,  which raises
the  profitability  of domestic  sales  and  lowers the  profitability o;  export  sales  because  of  induced
appreciation  in the real exchange rate.  If firm entry or exit depends on the joint profitability of sales in
both markets, then there is firm exit beca dse sectors with increasing returns to scale happen to have high
export shares in our numerical example.  Firm exit allows the remaining firms to move down their average
cost curves, thereby reaping the benefits of more efficient scale. If, however, one assumes that firm entry
is governed  by profits from sales in the domestic market alone, then there  is firm entry and protection
results in a welfare loss because of the loss in scale efficiency.
By symmetry, a rpolicy  of subsidizing exports has opposite effects.  Export  subsidization leads to
crowding-in if the decision to enter  depends on total profits because export subsidies lead to large profits
on export sales. For the caseof export subsidizatior- of sectorswith increasing returns to scale, the welfare
loss amounts to 1.7  percent of GDP.  If. on the other hand, one assumes that cxport  subsidies do not give
rise to abnormal profits but rather contribute  to defraying the costs (and risks) of selling in new markets,
there  is a small welfare  gain.  Interestingly,  in the case of export subsidization  in sectors  with scale
economies  there is a scale efficiency gain despite some firm entry.
The  results  presented  in  table  2 clearly  show  thit  if  Cournot  competition  is  a  reasonable
representation  of behavior in sectors with increasing rcturns to scale, lirm cntry and exit are crucial in
dctermining the sign and magnitude of the effects of trade policy interventions.  For the illustrative trade
policy interventions  reported  in table 2. one could argue that entry behavior based on total profits is the
more reasonable  assumption.  However, one can interpret  a policy of protection  more broadly as one
that produces  home-markct  bias because  it usuallv involves quotas and nontariff  barriers  that create
harriers to entry as competition  from abroad  is suppressed.  Then a sheltered  domestic market is likely
to lead to cxcessive firm entry because of high profits.7
On  the other  hand, the  experience  of successful East  Asian exporters  suggests that  it was the
provision  of export  incentives  that  put domestic  producers  on  an equal  looting  with their  foreign
Competitors.  As argued byvFrischtak  ct al. (1  989.1 (0-l  l). exporters nced support to make the commitment
to riskicr activities that have a long lead time and sunk costs for identifing  suitable markets and setting
up distributionchannels.  Underthisintcrpretation  orthccostsofestablishingsucccssfulexportactivities.-11 -
subsidies (or incentives that increase  the relative profitability of exports)  are not likely to give rise to
abnormally high profits and hence to induce excessive entry.
An altemative  interpretation  would emphasize that the appropriate  policy in a setting of increasing
returns  to scale is to promote  competition  in domestic  markets.  This logic recognizes  that imperfect
competition  in domestic markets can act as an export barrier  by increasing the relative profitability of
domestic operations.  Ideally, industrial policy  would be coordinated  with trade policy to encourage the
exploitation of efficient scale, promoting exports while avoiding excessive entry.8
Evaluation of Protection in Sectors with Scale Economies
We return  to the issues raised in the introduction:  are there welfare gains from protecting sectors
with increasing returns  to scale and how does import protection  compare  with neutral  incentives (for
example, with tariffs and export subsidies at equal  rates)?  To answer these  questions,  we report  on
simulations  in which we contrast  across-the-board  tariffs of 15 percent  with across-the-board  export
subsidies of 15 percent,  both  in sectors  with scale economies.  Protection  and  export  subsidies are
confined to the consumer, producer, and capital goods sectors. Nowwe assume a cost disadvantage ratio
of 20 percent, a value more in line with the unexploited economics  of scale in the manufacturing sector
of a typical semi-industrial country.
The results of these simulations appear in table 3. In the constant-returns-to-scale  benchmark case,
there  is, as before,  a welfare loss from protection  alone or from export subsidization alone.  Neutrality,
however, is less costly because the distortion introduced by the export subsidy partly offsets the distortion
introduced  by the tariff.
Table 3. Protection and Subsidization of Sectors with
Increasing Returns to Scale
(cost-disadvantage  ratio of 20 percent)
Proct-d-O-bidy  CRTS  Contetbea  (dOte3dC  ,oit)
15-percent  tariff
Equivalent  variation  -18  12  -106
Scale  efficiencv  0  31  -88
15-percent  export  subsidy
Equivalent vanation  -42  274  86
Scale  efficiencv  0  336  110
15-percent  tariff and export  subsidv
Equivalcnt vanation  -31  281  4
Scale  efficiencv  0  322  27
CRTS is constant  returns to scale.
Note:  AMI  figures are basis points of GDP (e.g., -106 is -1.06 percent of GDP).
a. Pncing according to equation  10.
b. Pricing according to  equation  11. vith  firm entrv and exit determined  bv profits on domestic
sales. so Ithat  .7rT  = 0-12-
Thc  same pattem  of welfare  estimates  emnerges  under  the assumption  of contestable  markets.
I lowever, because we have assumed a greater degree of unexploited economies of scale, the magnitudes
are larger than  in table 2.  There  is a welfare gain of 2.7 percent  of base year GDP  to be reaped  from
subsidizing export  sales of sectors with increasing  returns  to scale.  Note  the  superiority  of export
subsidization over import protection, which springs from our assumption that exporters  face a perfectly
elastic foreign demand whereas dorrmestically  produced goods face a downward sloping domestic demand
curvc.  1-ence thc  incentives  created  by export subsidization  are more  direct  than  those created  by
protection fordomestic sales. V/hik' the export demand specification deserves furtherscrutiny, it appears
to correspond  to the expericnce  of countries that have followed an export-led development strategy.
In  the  contestable-market  scenario,  neutrality  produces  the  largest welfare  gains from  trade
incentives to sectors with increasing returns to scale and sustains the recommendations of Balassa (1975,
1989).  In the case of Cournot  competition,  under  the assumptions about  firm entry, subsidization of
exporls dominates the alternativeof  providing equal incentives to domestic and exportsales.  This occurs
becausewc have assumed that subsidies to exportsdo not give rise to profits (and hence do not inducefirm
entry) vhereas  protection  on the domestic market gives rise to profits and induces firmentry.  Aswesaw
above, tirm entry results in scalc efficiencv losses, an effect that comesout clearly in the caseof protection
to domestic salcs.  In that case, tariff protection  results in a welfare loss that exceeds 1 percent of GDP.
It is obvious that the results under Cournot competition  are quite sensitive to the determinants  of
the number of firms-about  which little is known.  In the simulations reported  here, we have attempted
to portray the stylized facts suggested by the comparative studies of foreign trade regimes in developing
countrics.  These studies reveal that countries that have followed import-substitution  industrialization
stratcgies  have often  tended  to provide made-to-measure  protection  for all domestic activities.  This
protection  has, in turn, tended to create excess profit opportunities  from domestic sales. When pushed
to the cxtr, me, exccssivc across-the-board protcction  of industrial activities has been shown to result in
excessive firm entry.
We concludc by comparing  ncutrality of incentives with optimal trade  policy. The "optimal" trade
policv package is obtained  by maximizing  the value of the utility function for the representative consumer,
taking tariffsas givcen  and export subsidies as endogenous policy instruments. To facilitate the comparison
uith the rcsults in table 2, we fi-x  all import tariffs at 10 percent  for all sectors.
The results of the calculation of these "optimal" trade policy packages appear in table 4. Note first
that undcr the assumption of constant rcturns to scale in all sectors, the numerical calculations confirm
the well-known  rcsults  predictcd  bv Lcrncr  (1936), namely that  across-the-board  tariff  and  export
subsidics at the same rates arc cquivalent to free trade.9 Note also that the equivalent variation measure
achicvcs a maximum of zero in this case because departure  from free trade cannot be beneficial under
constant  returns to scale.
Under increasing rcturns  to scale. Lcrner svmmetrv still holds: across-the-board tariffs and export
subsidies at the samc rate are equivalent to free trade. But, as the pattern of export subsidy figures shows,
neutrality is no longer optimal.  Two results stand out in the contestable-market  case. First, as expected,
optimalitv rcquircsthatgrcaterincentivesbeprovidedtosectorswithincreasingreturnstoscale.  Second,
the diffcrcncc  in wclfare henef its is small between optimal trade policy and the rules of thumb advocated
by  Balassa (1975. 1989)- across-the-board protection (withequal incentivestoexports)  formanufacturing
activities. Here.optimalitvdominatestherulcofthumbofincentiveneutralitybylessthanlObasispoints.- 13-
Given the notorious  lack of the precise elasticity estimates needed  to calculate optimal incentivcs, the
illustrative calculations here do not support a departure  from the rule of thumb advocated by Balassa.
Table 4. Optimal Expor. Subsidies for a Given Ten-Percent
Import Tariff on All Tradeables
(cost-disadvantage  ratio of 10  percent)
Cmn
CTRlS  Cmttwabk  (do  crpflt)6
Equivalent  variation  °  66 (5 g)b  55  (-6)b
Scale eMckttcy (total)  128  102
Producer  goods  54  32
Consumer  goods  49  52
Heavy industry  24  18
Firm  entry
Producer  goods  -4
Consumer  goods  -12
Heavy industry  -11
Export subsidy
Primary products  10  -6  62
Food processing  10  -I  36
Producer  goods  10  24  33
Consumer  goods  10  27  25
Heavy industry  10  25  41
Traded services  10  -1  41
Note: The subsidy is in percentage points. Other  figures are in basis points.
a. Pricing according to equations  11, with firm entry determined  by profits  on domestic sales.
so that.7,  = 0.
b.Corresponding  equivalent variation figure under  neutrality, that is. from combining a 10-
percent  import  tariffwith  a 10-percent export subsidy in sectors  with increasing returns  to
scale.
In the case of Cournot competition. however, the optimal pattern of export subsidies dcparts further
from neutrality. Under thisscenario, an optimal policywould encourage firm exit to reapscale economies.
As the figures in the last column of table4 indicate, firm exit  would be achieved by providinghigherexport
subsidies to sectors with constant  returns to scale. 10 Now departure  from a simple rule of thumb yields
larger welfare benefits.  However, the discussion of table 2 suggested  that the  results under  Cournot
competition  areverysensitiveto  thedeterminantsof  firmentry, so these resultsshould be interpretedwith
care.
Conclusion
This paper  set out to  test the  robustness  of Balassa's recommendation  of neutral  incentives to
domestic and export sales in a setting where some sectors have domestic market power.  Wc have shown
analytically that the welfare effects of trade policy  are more complex than they are in a setting of across-
the-board  constant returns  to scale.  In particular, we have shown, analytically and numerically, that the
standard distortionary costs of protection emphasized under conditions of constant returns to scale must
be amended  to accommodate,  among other  things, the welfare  effects of changes in scale efficicncy.- 14-
be amended to accommodate,  among other things, the welfare effects of changes in scale efficiency.
Illustrative  numerical  calculations  also show that the magnitude  of the welfare  gains  or losses  from trade
policy  intervention are sensitive  to the determinants of firm  entry and exit.
Calculations  comparing  trade policies  that achieve  neutralityof  incentives  between  sales  to domestic
and those to foreign  markets  found such  policies  to be generally  superior to policies  creating  non-neutral
incentives. Numerical results also suggest that export promotion is likely to be more beneficial than
protection for sectors with increasing  returns to scale. Finally,  illustrative  calculations  of optimal  trade
policy packages suggest that  the  benefits  of  departing  from  the  principle of  neutrality, or
nondiscrimination between domestic and export sales, may be insufficient to justify their higher
administrative  costs.
Notes
The research reported here is part of the World Bank research project "Industrial Competition,
Productive  Efficiency  and Their Relation to Trade Regimes."  RPO 674-46.  The numerical  work  is  based
on a model developed in de Melo and Tarr (forthcoming). The views  expressed here are those of the
authors and should not be attributed to their affiliated  institutions.
1.  See Harris (1989) and Helpman and Krugman  (1989) for surveys  of this work.
2.  Imperfect substitutability in the allocation of sales implies that F; / Fyi varies along a convex
transformation  frontier. Lower case letters indicate partial  derivatives.
3.  The archetypal economy  was obtained from the free trade solution of a seven-sector CGE model
calibrated  to the Korean  economy  for the year 1982.  For a description  of the data set and parameters
values,  see de Melo and Roland-Holst  (forthcoming).
4.  The cost disadvantage  ratio is the difference  between average  and marginal  costs,  divided  by  average
costs. It is a measure of unrealized  economies  of scale.
5.  The aggregate  scale  efficiency  measure is  calculated  by usiig currcnt outputs as weights. For further
discussion,  sce de Melo and Roland-Hoist  (forthcoming).
6.  The magnitude  of this effect is small  for the functional  forms  specified  here and is not reported. For
a discussion  of its magnitude,  see de Melo and Roland-Holst  (forthcoming). Also, see Devarajan
and Rodrik (1989).
7.  Frischtak  et al. (1989)  document the pervasive  barriers to competition in the manufacturing  sectors
of developing countries.  Eastman and Stykolt (1962) is an early example of a model in which
protection  leads to firm entry. The typical example is the automobile industry in Latin America (see
Baranson 1968).
8.  In this regard,  the Korean experience  during the 1970s  is  instructive.  An activist  industrial  policywas
successful in promoting the growth of large conglomerates and reaping the benefits of scale
economies.  While exports benefited  from this policy, oligopolistic marketsdeveloped,  and avigorous
antitrust policvwas established in theearly  v980sto  promote greatercompetition  in domestic markets.
For further discussion, see Lee, Urata, and Choi (1988) and World Bank (1987).
9.  Since there  is no guarantee  that the optimal vector of subsidies is unique, numerical verification of
Lerner symmetry is a useful computational  check.
10. While the results of these optimal calculations  appear  reasonable,  there  is no guarantee  that the
comnputed  optima are global optima rather than local optima.  Hence these results should be viewed
as suggestive and subject to further  scrutiny.- 15-
Reffnces
Balassa, B. 1975. "Reforming the System of Incentives in Developing Countries." World Development
(June): 365-81.
Balassa, B. 1989. 'Tariff Policy and Taxation in Developing Countries." PPR Working Paper No. 281.
Washington,  D.C.: Policy, Planning, and Research, World Bank.
Balassa, B., and associates. 1971. The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries. Baltimore, Md.:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Balassa, B., and associates. 1982. Trade Strategies  for Semi-Industrial Countries. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Baranson, J. 1968. The Automotive  Industry in Latin America. Praeger: New York.
Bergsman, J. 1974. "Commercial Policy, Allocative Efficiency and X-
Efficiency." Quarterly Joumal of Economics 409-33.
Brander, J., and B. Spencer.  1984.  "Tariff Protection  and Imperfect Competition." In H. Kierzkowski,
ed.. Monopolistic Competition in International Trade. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chenery, H. 1975. "The Striicturalist Approach to Development  Policv."
American  Economic Review.
Corden,  M. 1967. "Monopoly, Tariffs and Subsidies." Economica 50-8.
Devarajan,  S., and D. Rodrik. 1989. "Pro-competitive Effects of Tariff Reform. ' Working Paper, J.F.
Kennedy School of Government,  Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Dixit, AK.  1984. "International  Trade Policy for Oligopoly Industries." Economic Joumal 94: 1-16.
Eastman,  H., and S. Stykolt. 1962. "A Model for the Study of Protected  Industries." Economic Journal
70:336-47.
Frischtak, C., with B. Hadjimichael, and U. Zachan.  1989.  Competition Policies  for Industrializing
Countries. Policy and Research Series No. 7. Washington,  D.C.: World Bank.
Harris, R.G.  1984. "Applied General  Equilibrium Analyses of Small Open Economies with Scale
Economies and Imperfect Competition."American  Economic Review 74:1016-33.
Harris, R.G.  1989. "The New Protectionism  Revisited." Canadian Joumal of Economics 24, no. 4:
751-78.
Helpman, E., anc P. Krugman. 1989. Trade Policy and Market Structure. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press.
Horstmann,  I.. and J. Markusen.  1986.  "Up the Average Cost Curve: Inefficient Entry and the New
Protectionism." Joumal of International Economics, 225-48.
Krugman, P. 1984. "Import Protection  as Export Promotion." In H. Kierzkowski, ed.. Mfonopolistic
Competition in Intemational  Trade. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lee, K., S. Urata, and 1. Choi. 1988. "Recent Developments  in Industrial Organization  in Korea."
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Lerner,  A  1936. "The Symmetry Between Import and Export Taxes."  Economica 3: 306-13.
Melo, J. de. and D.W. Roland-Hoist.  Forthcoming.  "Industrial Organization and Trade Liberalization:
Evidence from Korea" in R. E. Baldwin. ed., Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Melo, J. de. and D. Tarr.  Forthcoming. A  General Equilibrium Analysis of US Foreign Trade Policv
Cambridge,  MIT Press.
Rodrik. D. 1988.  "Imperfect Competition.  Scale Economies, and Trade Policy in Developing
Countries."  In R.E. Baldwin, ed., Trade Policv Issues and EmpiricalAnalysis.  Chicago: University
of Chicago Prcss and Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Rcscarch.
Venables, A  1985. "Trade and Trade Policy with Imperfect  Competition: The Case of Identical
Products  and Free Entr'." Joumal of Intemational  Economics 1-19.
World Bank. 1987. Korea: ,fanaging  the Industrial Transition. Washington. D.C.: World Bank.ERE W kin  PaDer  Series
Contact
ide  AuAhor  for pape
WPS455 A Formal  Fstirnation  of the,  Effect  Junichi  Goto  June 1990  M. T. Sanchez
of tile MFA  on Clothing  Exports  33731
from LDCs
WPS456  Improving  the Supply  and  Use  of  S. D. Foster  June 1990  Z. Vania
Essential  D)rugs  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  33664
WPS457 i-inancing  Health  Services  in Africa:  Germano  Mwabu  June 1990  Z. Vania
An Assessment  of Alternative  33664
Approaches
WPS 58  Does  Japanese  Direct  Foreign  Kenji  Takeuchi  June 1990  J. Epps
Investment  Promote  Japanese  Imports  33710
from Developing  Countries?
WPS459  Policies  for Economic  Development  Stanley  Fischer  June 1990  WDR  Office
Vinod  Thomas  31393
WPS460  Does  Food  Aid  Depress  Food  Victor Lavy  July 1990  A. Murphy
Production?  The  Disincentive  33750
Dilemma  in the African  Context
WPS461  Labor  Market  Participation,  Returns  Shahidur  R. Khandker  July 1990  B.  Smith
to Education,  and  Male-Female  35108
Wage Differences  in Peru
WPS462  An  Aiternative  View  of Tax  Anwar  Shah  July 1990  A. Bhalla
Incidence  Analysis  for Developing  John  Whalley  37699
Countries
WPS463  Redefining  Government's  Role  in  Odin Knudsen  August  1990  K. Cabana
Agriculture  in the Nineties  John  Nash  37946
WPS464  Does  A Woman's  Education  Affect  Shoshana  Neuman  August  1990  V. Charles
Her Husband's  Earnings?  Results  Adrian  Ziderman  33651
for Israel  in A Dual  Labor  Market
WPS465  How  Integrated  Are  Tropical  Timber  Panos  Varangis  August 1990  D. Gustafson
Markets?  33714
WPS466  Is There  An Intra-Household  Lawrence  Haddad  August 1990  J. Sweeney
Kuznets  Curve?  Ravi  Kanbur  31021
WPS467 Structural  Adjustment  and Living  Nanak  Kakwani  August  1990  B. Rosa
Conditions  in Developing  Countries  Elene  Makonnen  33751
Jacques  van der  Gaag
WPS468  Does  the Structure  of Production  Indermit  Gill  August  1990  M. Abundo
Affect  Demand  for Schooling  in Peru?  36820PRE  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
TA6  Auhor  for paper
WPS469  Modeling  Economic  Behavior  in  J. Barry  Smith  August  1990  M. Abundo
Peru's  Informal  Urban  Retail  Sector  Morton  Stelcner  36820
WPS470 What  Do Alternative  Measures  of  Alexander  J. Yeats  August  1990  J. Epps
Comparative  Advantage  Reveal  33710
About  the Composition  of Developing
Countries'  Exports?
WPS471 The  Determinants  of Farm  Gershon  Feder  August  1990  C. Spooner
Investment  and Residential  Lawrence  J. Lau  30464
Construction  in Post-Reform  China  Justin Lin
Xiaopeng  Luo
WPS472 Gains  in the Education  of Peruvian  Elizabeth  M. King  August  1990  C. Cristobal
Women,  1940  to 1980  Rosemary  Bellew  33640
WPS473 Adjustment,  Investment,  and  the  Riccardo  Faini  August  1990  R. Sugui
Real  Exchange  Rate  in Developing  Jaime  de Melo  37951
Countries
WPS474  Methods  for Measuring  the Effect  Anne  Maasland  August  1990  P. Dixon
of Adjustment  Policies  on Income  39175
Distribution
WPS475  Does  Divestiture  Matter? A  Ahmed  Galal  August1990  G. Orraca-Tette
Framework  for Learning  from  Experience  37646
WPS476 Health  Insurance  in Sub-Saharan  Ronald  J. Vogel  August 1990  K.  Brown
Africa: A Survey  and  Analysis  35073
WPS477 Private  Participation  in the Delivery  Thelma  A. Triche  August 1990  M. Dhokai
of Guinea's  Water  Supply  Services  33970
WPS478  Interrelations  Among  Child Mortality, John Marcotte  August 1990  S. Cochrane
Breastfeeding,  and Fertility  in  John  B. Casterline  33222
Egypt,  1975-80
WPS479 Conversion  Factors: A Discussion  Michael  Hee  August  1990  E.  Zamora
of Alternate  Rates  and Corresponding  33706
Weights
WPS480 An Evaluatior  of Neutral  Trade  Policy Jaime  de Melo  August  1990  R. Sugui
Incentives  Under  Increasing  Returns David  Roland-Holst  37951
to Scale
WPS481 The  Effects  of  Trade  Reforms  on  James  Tybout  August  1990  R. Sugui
Scale and Technical  Efficiency:  Jaime  de Melo  37951
New  Evidence  from  Chile  Vittorio  Corbo
WPS482  Membership  in the  CFA  Zone:  Shantayanan  Devarajan  August  1990  R. Sugui
Odyssean  Journey  or Trojan  Horse?  Jaime  de Melo  37951